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INTRODUCTION
Title VII was twenty-five years old when Kimberlé Crenshaw published her
path-breaking article introducing “intersectionality” to critical legal
scholarship.1 By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reached its thirtieth
birthday, the intersectionality critique had come of age, generating a
sophisticated subfield and producing many articles that remain classics in the
field of anti-discrimination law and beyond.2 Employment discrimination law
was not the only target of intersectionality critics, but Title VII’s failure to
∗
Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Essay
draws on my previous scholarship, especially SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE:
FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2011). Special thanks to Linda
McClain and Khiara Bridges for hosting a wonderful symposium, to Smita Ghosh for superb
research assistance, and to Jared Iverson and the staff of the Boston University Law Review
for their editorial prowess.
1 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. I adopt, for purposes of this Essay, a broad and admittedly
imprecise definition of the term “intersectionality.” For a salutary reading of the term’s
ambiguity, see Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science
Perspective on what Makes a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 1; Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 (1994); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
539; Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
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capture and ameliorate the particular experiences of women of color loomed
large in this early legal literature.3 Courts proved especially reluctant to
recognize multi-dimensional discrimination against African American female
plaintiffs, reenacting the phenomenon encapsulated in the title of a 1982 Black
feminist anthology: All the Women are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But
Some of Us Are Brave.4 By the mid-1990s, most courts no longer rejected
intersectional claims out of hand.5 But well into the twenty-first century,
scholars find that “complex discrimination” claimants fare even worse than
other employment discrimination plaintiffs, facing both structural and
ideological barriers to recognition and redress.6
Although the term “intersectionality” dates to the late 1980s, the concept’s
history predates the Civil Rights Act itself.7 Moreover, what we now call
intersectionality crucially shaped Title VII from its inception. Over the past
two decades, historians have uncovered the critical role of intersectionality—
and of women of color—in pre-Civil Rights Act activism against sex- and
race-based employment discrimination; in the enactment of Title VII’s sex
discrimination amendment; in early enforcement efforts; in advocacy to
expand the definition of sex discrimination (to include, for instance, sexual
harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and discrimination against unmarried
3

See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE
BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN’S STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982). See also, e.g., THIS
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe Moraga &
Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 1981); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); BELL
HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 13 (1981).
5 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir.
1980) (“[D]iscrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of
discrimination against black men or white women.”); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (“Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
any individual because of race or because of sex. ‘The use of the word “or” evidences
Congress’ intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of the listed
characteristics.’” (quoting Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032)); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d
1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (“As other courts have recognized, where two bases for
discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct components.”).
6 See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 991, 992 (2011)
(“[P]laintiffs who make intersectional claims, alleging that they were discriminated against
based on more than one ascriptive characteristic, are only half as likely to win their cases as
are other plaintiffs.”); Bradley Allan Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a
Wrinkle in Title VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 199, 234-35 (2006) (proposing an
amendment to Title VII because intersectional plaintiffs “lack[] full recourse”); Minna J.
Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1439, 1440 (2009) (“A sample of summary judgment decisions reveals that employers
prevail on multiple claims at a rate of 96 percent, as compared to 73 percent on employment
discrimination claims in general.”).
7 See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
4
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parents); and in the development of constitutional sex equality arguments that
influenced, and were shaped by, the evolution of Title VII.8
History, legal theory, and (to a lesser extent) anti-discrimination doctrine all
incorporate accounts—explicit and implicit—of the relationship between
intersectionality and Title VII. Rarely, however, do these accounts intersect (so
to speak). This Essay is a preliminary and partial effort to put those disparate
literatures in conversation, and to focus attention on the pre-history of
intersectionality and Title VII. Doing so reveals how the insights Crenshaw
and her contemporaries brilliantly theorized and elaborated during Title VII’s
second quarter-century are part of a longer and more complicated history than
we often acknowledge.9

8

See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2011) [hereinafter MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE] (examining the roots of
feminist legal advocacy in intersectional experience); SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER
FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT 176-206 (1998) (describing black
feminists’ “pursui[t of] feminist goals outside both the autonomous women’s movement and
the civil rights movement”); NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 117-54 (2006) (recognizing the pivotal role of African
American feminists in shaping the early history of Title VII); CARRIE N. BAKER, THE
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL HARASSMENT passim (2008) (chronicling black
women’s pivotal roles as activists, plaintiffs, and government officials in the struggle
against sexual harassment); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN,
AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 226-33, 240-48,
225-59, 262-68, 277-80, 283-88 (2001) (discussing evolving views about the relationship
between race and sex discrimination in the 1960s and 1970s); LINDA K. KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 18499 (1998) (relating Pauli Murray’s role in the struggle for race and sex equality in jury
service); Eileen Boris, The Gender of Discrimination: Race, Sex, and Fair Employment,
in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION AND
PRACTICE 273, 273 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003) (describing
neglect of “interactive discrimination” faced by black women); Eileen Boris, Ledbetter’s
Continuum: Race, Gender, and Pay Discrimination, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS
ON WOMEN AND LAW 240 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracy Jean Boisseau eds., 2011) (describing
the interaction between race and sex in early pay discrimination cases); Serena Mayeri,
Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 755, 759 (2004) [hereinafter Mayeri, Constitutional Choices] (exploring feminists’
“dual constitutional strategy” and its relationship to “the interconnectedness of race and sex
equality”); Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender
Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1046, 1052-72 (2001)
[hereinafter Mayeri, A Common Fate] (investigating “the particular historical context of the
1960s in which race-sex analogies emerged as a central component of modern feminist legal
thought”).
9 Cf. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of
the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005).
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THE MYTHOLOGY OF TITLE VII’S SEX AMENDMENT

For much of the Civil Rights Act’s first quarter-century, the origins of Title
VII’s “sex” amendment10 were shrouded in layers of mythology and
(sometimes willful) misunderstanding. Skeptical commentators and courts
routinely dismissed the amendment as a “joke” or “fluke,” born of
segregationist antipathy to African American civil rights.11 At best, went the
conventional wisdom, Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination was an illconceived afterthought; at worst, a “killer amendment” designed to scuttle the
civil rights bill and destined to undermine its primary purpose.12 Government
officials, including early EEOC members, explicitly prioritized race
discrimination and denigrated the sex amendment’s importance.13 This
dismissive attitude toward the sex amendment, together with increasingly
organized feminist activism and unexpectedly voluminous sex discrimination
complaints flooding the EEOC, galvanized a resurgent women’s movement to
demand real protection against employment discrimination.14
Early and influential accounts of the Civil Rights Act’s enactment
perpetuated the myth that the sex amendment’s passage was little more than
the accidental byproduct of segregationist mischief.15 This myth of the sex
amendment as “joke” or “fluke” proved remarkably resilient, despite early
revelations about the involvement of the National Woman’s Party (“NWP”)
and female members of Congress in pushing for an amendment banning sex
discrimination.16 In some instances, feminists mobilized the myth for critical
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
11 JO FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION 54 (1975); see also Mayeri, A
Common Fate, supra note 8, at 1063.
12 See sources cited infra note 15.
13 See, e.g., FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 185.
14 On the EEOC’s failure to enforce the sex discrimination provision of Title VII, see
FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 76-79; HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 205-32 (1990); CYNTHIA HARRISON,
ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 192-209 (1988);
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 246-47.
15 See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 234 (1985) (“[The proposed sex amendment] did
not come about through strenuous lobbying by women’s groups; it was the result of a
deliberate ploy by foes of the bill to scuttle it.”); Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment
Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 79 (1964) (“The sex
amendment can best be described as an orphan, since neither the proponents nor the
opponents of Title VII seem to have felt any responsibility for its presence in the bill.”);
Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REV. 778,
791 (1965) (“The bill’s history does reveal that, as the debate over racial aspects of the Civil
Rights Act grew more heated, foes of its passage drafted an amendment to include sex,
presumably designed to defeat the entire act.”).
16 See, e.g., PATRICIA G. ZELMAN, WOMEN, WORK, AND NATIONAL POLICY: THE
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purposes, as when Catharine MacKinnon wrote in a landmark 1991 article that
“sex discrimination in private employment was forbidden under federal law
only in a last minute joking ‘us boys’ attempt to defeat Title VII’s prohibition
on racial discrimination.”17 Courts, too, used the “joke” theory to various ends
when discussing Title VII’s legislative history.18
The scholars and commentators who discredited the notion that Title VII’s
sex amendment was a fluke highlighted the NWP’s behind-the-scenes
advocacy and the House floor debate, which featured Rep. Martha Griffiths’s
skillful manipulation of segregationist concern for the “White Christian
Woman of United States Origin.”19 A new picture emerged from early
literature debunking the “joke” myth: now the key actors in the story of the sex
amendment’s enactment included congresswomen such as Griffiths and
Katherine St. George; NWP leaders such as Alice Paul, Emma Guffey Miller,
and Nina Horton Avery; and, in some versions, the journalist May Craig.20
This story improved upon the conventional narrative, to be sure. But it may
inadvertently have helped to perpetuate the misconception that the sex
KENNEDY-JOHNSON YEARS 60 (1982); Caruthers Gholson Berger, Equal Pay, Equal
Employment Opportunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 VAL. U. L. REV.
326, 336-37 (1970) (“[T]he accusation of misogynists that the passage of the sex
discrimination provision was Representative Smith’s joke contrived to hurt racial minorities
is utterly untrue.”); Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress
Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L.
REV. 453, 453-54 (1980) (“The conventional view is that sex was added as a protected class
to the employment discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) for the purpose
of defeating it by making it unacceptable to some of its supporters or by laughing it to death.
. . . And [the conventional view] is wrong.”).
17 She continued: “Sex was added as a prohibited ground of discrimination when this
attempted reductio ad absurdum failed and the law passed anyway.” Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991).
For more examples, see Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at
the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 137, 139-40 (1997).
18 See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (2012) (“[C]ourts commonly cited the lack of legislative history
attending Title VII’s sex provision as a reason for interpreting the statute narrowly.”);
Rachel Osterman, Comment, Origins of a Myth: Why Courts, Scholars, and the Public
Think Title VII’s Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
409, 425-34 (2009) (tracing judicial treatment of the sex provision’s legislative history).
19 Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 772; see also GRAHAM, supra note 14,
at 137; Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37, 37-56
(describing political pressure for the sex amendment from the NWP and from Griffiths); Jo
Freeman, How “Sex” Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public
Policy, 9 L. & INEQ. 163, 172-79 (1991) (describing the NWP’s efforts to have “sex” added
to the Civil Rights Act).
20 See Brauer, supra note 19, at 39-45.
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amendment’s primary constituencies were white women and lawmakers who
were indifferent, or even hostile, toward racial justice and civil rights.
II.

THE INTERSECTIONAL ORIGINS OF TITLE VII’S SEX AMENDMENT

During Title VII’s second quarter-century, a consensus emerged among
historians that the sex amendment should be seen not only as the product of an
unholy alliance between white feminists and segregationist conservatives, but
also as reinforcing a longer tradition of advocacy that married the causes of
racial justice and women’s rights. True, the House sex amendment debate
depicted a prohibition on sex discrimination as necessary to prevent white
women from standing “last at the hiring gate,”21 and prominent progressive
Democrats, such as Edith Green of Oregon, opposed the amendment for fear it
would sink the civil rights legislation altogether.22 But when the bill reached
the Senate, African American lawyer Pauli Murray, a veteran of the civil rights
movement and of personal battles against “Jane Crow,” wrote an influential
memorandum designed to persuade civil rights supporters that the sex
amendment was integral, rather than antithetical, to Title VII’s goals.23
Circulated to members of Congress and the Johnson administration, Murray’s
memo presciently reframed the sex amendment as a unifying, rather than
divisive, force within the broader civil rights and women’s advocacy
communities.24
The memo, circulated in April 1964 as the sex discrimination provision
approved by the House in February faced danger in the Senate, was written in
the style of a brief.25 Murray first laid out the arguments for and against the sex
amendment as articulated during the House debate: opponents concerned about
the fate of the civil rights bill worried, above all, that the sex amendment
would “clutter up the bill and jeopardize its primary purpose” of “end[ing]
discrimination against Negroes.”26 And the amendment’s most vocal
21

110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Griffiths).
See id. at 2581 (statement of Edith Green) (“[L]et us not add any amendment that
would place in jeopardy in any way our primary objective of ending that discrimination that
is most serious, most urgent, most tragic, and most widespread against the Negroes of our
country.”). Edith Green herself was an avid proponent of women’s rights, having
championed a much more capacious version of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 than the
legislation that resulted. On Green and the Equal Pay Act, see DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE
OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 163, 165-66 (2004); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 8, at 23637; see also HARRISON, supra note 14, at 100, 102.
23 Pauli Murray, Memorandum in Support of Retaining the Amendment to H.R. 7152,
Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity) to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment
Because of Sex (Apr. 14, 1964) (Pauli Murray Papers, MC 412, Box 85, Folder 1485, on file
with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University) [hereinafter Murray,
Title VII Memorandum]; see also Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774.
24 See Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774.
25 Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23.
26 Id. at 2. Opponents also argued that “the amendment would be an entering wedge to
22

2015]

INTERSECTIONALITY AND TITLE VII

719

proponents framed the sex discrimination provision as necessary to protect
white women, “since employers, fearing prosecution for race discrimination
under the act, will tend to give preference to Negro women (and Negro men)
over white women.”27
Murray’s memo critically reframed the debate. Instead of a contest pitting
“Negroes” against “women” or “Negro women and men” against “white
women,” Murray’s analysis made the fate of “Negro women” the ultimate
barometer of the civil rights bill’s success. “[I]f there is no ‘sex’ amendment,”
Murray warned,
both Negro and white women will share a common fate of discrimination,
since it is exceedingly difficult for a Negro woman to determine whether
or not she is being discriminated against because of race or sex. These
two types of discrimination are so closely entertwined [sic] and so similar
that Negro women are uniquely qualified to affirm their
interrelatedness.28
Murray, who had often spoken of the “twin immoralities” of “Jim and Jane
Crow,” theorized black women’s singular experience in language that
anticipated the concept Crenshaw would term “intersectionality” a quartercentury later.29
Murray’s Title VII memo was part of a larger strategy that predated the
Civil Rights Act’s enactment. Murray had long protested the exclusion of
“Negro women” from visible leadership positions in the civil rights movement,
and by the early 1960s, she had become a key figure in a revitalized interracial
feminist movement.30 An earlier memorandum—authored by Murray when she
served on the Civil and Political Rights Committee of the President’s
Commission on the Status of Women—had revolutionized feminist
constitutional strategy by urging that advocates for women circumvent the
divisive Equal Rights Amendment controversy by pursuing a Fourteenth
Amendment litigation campaign modeled on the NAACP Legal Defense

destroy protective legislation favorable to women”; that “Congress has not had time to study
this proposal; there is no legislative record or findings and hearings should be held before
any vote is taken on the amendment”; and that “biological differences between men and
women pose different problems with respect to employment, and thus Congress should wait
until further studies are made.” Id. at 2-3. See also 110 CONG. REC. 2578-84 (1964).
27 Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3.
28 Id. at 20.
29 Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 774, 806.
30 See SARAH AZARANSKY, THE DREAM IS FREEDOM: PAULI MURRAY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC FAITH 62 (2011); MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 119-23; MAYERI, REASONING
FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 16-23; Serena Mayeri, Pauli Murray and the TwentiethCentury Quest for Legal and Social Equality, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQ. 80, 88 (2013). On
Murray’s earlier activism, see generally GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE
RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1919-1950 (2008); KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING
THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012).
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Fund’s successful desegregation efforts.31 Murray’s strategic use of analogies
between race and sex discrimination linked civil rights and feminism both
rhetorically and practically.32
Crucially, Murray understood “Negro women’s” central importance to the
civil rights struggle through the lens of history—a history replete with conflict
between and within movements for racial justice and women’s rights. These
movements ignored the imperatives of coalition at their peril, Murray
warned.33 Past failures to unite—for instance, the post-Civil War rift between
advocates of black male enfranchisement and women’s suffrage—had not only
obscured African American women’s interests, but also fatally undermined an
alliance that might have prevented everything from post-Reconstruction
retrenchment to lynching.34
Murray linked the need for a sex discrimination prohibition not only to
black women’s underrepresentation in lucrative jobs, but also to their
overrepresentation among women who provided the sole or primary support
for their families. “In a more sharply defined struggle than is apparent in any
other social group in the United States, [the Negro woman] is literally engaged
in a battle for sheer survival,” she wrote.35 The “Negro woman,” Murray
explained, had trouble “finding a mate, remains single longer and in higher
incidence, bears more children, is in the labor market longer, has less
education, earns less, is widowed earlier and carries a heavier economic burden
as a family head than her white counterpart.”36 For many of her male
contemporaries, both inside and outside the civil rights movement, the cure for
these ills was to shore up black men’s employment prospects through the civil
rights bill and other legislation. For Murray, however, such an approach was a
halfway measure at best. “Title VII without the ‘sex’ amendment would
benefit Negro males primarily and thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to
only half of the potential Negro work force,” Murray wrote.37 Given that “[t]he
Negro woman must be prepared to support herself and others for a
considerable period of her life . . . if civil rights legislation is to be effective, it
must of necessity include protection against discrimination in employment by
reason of sex.”38
Murray’s intersectional position also helped her to foresee the essential role
an inclusive Title VII could play in uniting social movements through a
convergence of common interests. Employers historically exploited workers
31

See Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 8, at 1057-58.
I have discussed this phenomenon at greater length in earlier works. See generally
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8; Mayeri, A Common Fate, supra note 8.
33 See Murray, Title VII Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4-9.
34 Id. at 9-11.
35 Id. at 21.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 20-21.
38 Id. at 23.
32
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through divide-and-conquer tactics, especially in “semi-skilled and unskilled
categories where women and Negroes are found in large numbers.”39 Murray
predicted that “[u]nless all workers are reassured that they will have equal
employment opportunities bitter competition and conflict with racial
implications will continue . . . thereby defeating the main purpose” of the bill.40
Hope that the inclusion of sex in Title VII would help to bridge these divisions
and address the particular needs of “Negro women” suffused Murray’s memo.
III. TITLE VII, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
COALITION41
Title VII’s passage was indeed a watershed in the relationship between the
civil rights and feminist movements. Its enactment swiftly and decisively
destroyed the alliance of convenience between conservative white feminists
and segregationists. Title VII also united and galvanized advocates for women
long divided over sex-specific protective labor legislation. Moreover, by tying
the fates of race and sex discrimination claims together, Title VII—perhaps
more than any other legislative enactment—cemented a sometimes uneasy, but
nonetheless crucial, alliance between civil rights and women’s rights. By the
early 1970s, the category “women and minorities”—virtually unthinkable just
a few years earlier—had entered the American political lexicon. Title VII and
the advocates who ensured its enforcement could claim much of the credit.42
Title VII took effect in 1965, the same year that the Moynihan Report
crystallized a consensus among commentators and policymakers that restoring
African American men to their proper role as breadwinning heads of
households was a prerequisite for racial progress.43 In the late 1960s, civil
rights leaders not only prioritized African American male employment, but
many viewed equal employment opportunity for women of all races as
antithetical to achieving racial justice and equality.44 At the same time, some
longtime advocates for labor and civil rights, including Murray herself,
worried that organizations like the National Organization for Women
(“NOW”) stifled the voices of women with multifaceted identities and political
commitments.45
39

Id. at 19.
Id.
41 The discussion in this Part incorporates text adapted from MAYERI, REASONING FROM
RACE, supra note 8.
42 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 41-75; see also MACLEAN,
supra note 8, at 154; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 773-77 (illustrating
how Title VII’s passage “provided an unprecedented link between struggles for racial justice
and sex equality”).
43 See Serena Mayeri, Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93
B.U. L. REV. 729, 730 (2013) and sources cited therein.
44 Id. at 731.
45 See HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 189-90; MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note
40
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Against this backdrop, a small cadre of black feminist lawyers, activists, and
government officials insisted that women’s advancement in the workplace and
egalitarian partnerships with men were crucial to realizing the promise of the
civil rights movement. The key figures in this story were African American
women who used their multi-dimensional identities and their positions at the
intersection of the civil rights and women’s movements to promote a
distinctive brand of feminist activism and an expansive interpretation of Title
VII’s promise. This black feminist legal agenda responded directly to the
Moynihanian consensus and to the limitations of both mainstream liberal
feminism and civil rights advocacy.46
No mere outsiders or gadflies, these women were enormously influential in
Title VII’s early development. Pauli Murray’s seminal 1965 article Jane Crow
and the Law, co-authored with Mary Eastwood, encapsulated the feminist case
for vigorous enforcement of anti-sex discrimination norms under Title VII and
the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Murray’s call for a women’s “March on
Washington” to protest the EEOC’s failure to enforce the sex amendment
made national headlines,48 and foreshadowed her role as co-founder of NOW
in 1966.49 As chair of the New York City Human Rights Commission in the
early 1970s, Eleanor Holmes Norton vigorously investigated, publicized, and
expanded the scope of antidiscrimination laws: she prioritized claims based on
sex as well as race, and included low-income women and women of color as
key constituencies.50 As President of NOW and co-founder of Black Women
Organized for Action in the early 1970s, Aileen Hernandez joined Murray and
Norton in building coalitions between white-dominated women’s
organizations, male-dominated civil rights groups, and a growing contingent of
self-identified black feminists.51
8, at 36; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 790-92.
46 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 41-42; MACLEAN, supra note 8,
at 153; PAULI MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT: AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE 356-57
(1987).
47 Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965).
48 Pauli Murray, Remarks at the Women and Title VII Conference, National Council of
Women of the United States 13 (Oct. 12, 1965) (Mary Eastwood Papers, MC 596, Box 4,
Folder 34, on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University);
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 23-24; Mayeri, Constitutional Choices,
supra note 8, at 776.
49 See Mayeri, Constitutional Choices, supra note 8, at 784.
50 See MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 143-45; MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note
8, at 46-49.
51 See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 45-47. On Black Women
Organized for Action, the National Black Feminist Organization, and other organized
African American feminist groups in the 1970s, see KIMBERLY SPRINGER, LIVING FOR THE
REVOLUTION: BLACK FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS, 1968-1980 (2005). See also PAULA
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN
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If the intersectional identities and experiences of women such as Murray,
Norton, and Hernandez critically shaped their advocacy and motivated their
coalition-building efforts, so too did the maturation of Title VII litigation and
enforcement unite the civil rights and feminist movements to an unprecedented
degree. Whereas in the mid- to late-1960s the women’s movement seemed like
a threat rather than a boon to the civil rights movement, by the early 1970s,
civil rights leaders and their congressional supporters recognized women’s
rights advocates as indispensable allies. This dramatic and relatively rapid
transformation owed a considerable debt to the political economy of
employment discrimination law. Cases such as Phillips v. Martin-Marietta
Corp.,52 which challenged a policy excluding mothers of preschool-age
children from employment, made clear that a broad interpretation of Title VII’s
bona fide occupational qualification exception could endanger the rights of
racial and religious minorities as well. Ida Phillips was white and widowed,
“but her plight as a [single] working mother resembled that of many African
American women.”53 Recognizing the possible spillover effects in race
discrimination law, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (“LDF”) took Phillips’s
case, arguing that the “‘primary adverse impact’ of Martin-Marietta’s policy
was ‘on blacks,’ since ‘[m]ore than twice as many non-white mothers as white
mothers’ were ‘heads of families.’”54 Feminists, too, used the Phillips case to
make common cause with the civil rights movement.
Feminists capitalized on women’s potential political and electoral clout, as
well as “Title VII’s linkage of race and sex” to win over skeptical civil rights
leaders.55 By the early 1970s, feminists and civil rights advocates together
championed extending the EEOC’s jurisdiction to educational institutions and
state and local governments. As lawmakers debated the amendments to Title
VII, the Congressional Record teemed with earnest declarations about the
menace of sex discrimination.56 Civil rights and women’s rights advocates
collaborated in several national actions and lawsuits against large companies
such as DuPont, Hughes Tool, Firestone, and the Big Three automakers.57 A
coalition of feminist and civil rights groups won a landmark consent decree
with AT&T, addressing occupational segregation uncovered by the African
American economist Phyllis Wallace.58 In short, by 1973, thanks in no small
part to the pioneering advocacy of African American feminists, the women’s
AMERICA (1984).
52 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
53 MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 51.
54 Id. at 53 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Phillips, 400 U.S. 542 (No. 69-1058)).
55 Id. at 54.
56 “A House report declared that ‘women’s rights are not judicial divertissements,’ and
that sex discrimination was ‘to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any
type of unlawful discrimination.’” Id. at 55.
57 Id. at 56.
58 Id. (citing MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 131-32).
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movement and civil rights advocates had formed a powerful alliance—and
Title VII was among its most potent weapons.
Intersectionality did not only inform an oppositional critique of employment
discrimination law; intersectional experience also proved a constructive,
integrative force in expanding Title VII’s substantive reach.59 Two striking
examples involve discrimination against unmarried mothers and the
development of sexual harassment as a harm prohibited under Title VII.60 In
both instances, African American women pioneered as plaintiffs in cases that
redefined employment practices once seen as “natural” and legitimate as
violations of women’s civil rights.
Before Title VII, employers could, and did, discriminate against women
based on sex, marital status, or both. After Title VII’s passage, marriage bars
and anti-nepotism rules continued to prevent many women from obtaining or
retaining jobs when they married. Also common were formal or informal rules
prohibiting the employment of unmarried mothers or parents known to have
“illegitimate” children.61 Initially, civil rights advocates challenged these
policies as racially discriminatory: for instance, in 1968, the NAACP LDF
filed a suit against Southwestern Bell for excluding “unwed mothers” from
employment.62 An Arkansas federal district court judge rejected the LDF’s
arguments: “[M]ore Negro women have illegitimate children than do white
women,” he acknowledged, but this fact, though “interesting sociologically,”
did not render the policy unlawful.63 Employers had a “legitimate interest at
least to a point in the sexual behavior of [their] employees and their morale
while at work. A woman who has had an illegitimate child,” Judge Jesse Smith
Henley wrote, “can well have an upsetting effect on other employees . . . .”64
Even if “certain classes of Negroes have a different attitude toward
extramarital sex than do most white people,” he wrote, Title VII did not
“require[] an employer to conform his standards to the Negro attitude.”65
Judge Henley did not consider whether Southwestern Bell’s exclusion of
unmarried mothers might violate Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, but
others soon did.66 When an African American woman rejected for a job as a
telephone operator filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC in 1970,
the employer explained that her status as an unwed mother, not her race, was

59

I develop this argument with respect to constitutional law in MAYERI, REASONING
supra note 8, at 144-85.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 145-67.
62 Id. at 153 (citing Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., No. LR-68-C-81, 1969
WL 109 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969)).
63 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9).
64 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9).
65 Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell, 1969 WL at *9).
66 Id.
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the basis for its decision not to hire her.67 The EEOC ruled that the employer’s
policy discriminated based on race and sex, in violation of Title VII.68 Since
“80 percent of ‘illegitimate’ births in the surrounding community were to ‘nonwhite females,’” the disproportionate impact constituted race discrimination.69
And even if the employer had attempted to apply the “illegitimacy standard” to
unmarried fathers too, the decision noted, “it’s a wise employer indeed that
knows which of its male applicants truthfully answered its illegitimacy
inquiry.”70 Thus, the EEOC declared, the “foreseeable and certain impact of an
illegitimacy standard . . . is to deprive females . . . of employment
opportunities.”71 In short, the intersection of race and sex alerted judges and
administrators to the multifaceted discriminatory impact of employment bans
based on non-marital childbearing.
African American women also led the way in expanding Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision to proscribe sexual harassment.72 Historically, women
of color had been especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation at the hands of
employers. Black female plaintiffs, primed by their experiences with racial
discrimination and harassment, brought many of the early cases against
employers that characterized sexual objectification and coercion in the
workplace as wrongful civil rights violations, rather than interpersonal
problems to be endured in silence.73 During her years in local and federal
government, Eleanor Holmes Norton was among the first government officials
to recognize and combat sexual harassment.74 Black feminist legal
practitioners and scholars such as Judy Trent Ellis (later Judy Scales-Trent)
used sexual harassment law as a basis for larger critiques of courts’ failure to
grapple with intersectionality.75 Long before Anita Hill’s testimony at Clarence
Thomas’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings transformed her into the
foremost spokesperson against sexual harassment and an inspiration for a new

67

Id.
Id. (citing EEOC Decision No. 71-332, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1016 (1970)).
69 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1016).
70 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1017).
71 Id. (quoting EEOC Decision No. 71-332, at 1017).
72 Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment in the 1970s, 30 FEMINIST STUD.
7 (2004); see also MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 144. This history is
more familiar to legal scholars. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 127-41 (1979); Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 1469-70 (1992) (“Perhaps
it is due to this racialization of sexual harassment that Black women are disproportionate[ly]
represented as plaintiffs in these cases. . . . Racism may provide the clarity to see that sexual
harassment is . . . an intentional act of sexual discrimination . . . .”).
73 See BAKER, supra note 8, at 15-17.
74 See id. at 32, 115.
75 See id. at 98-99; Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of
Discrimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 30-45 (1981).
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wave of intersectionality scholarship, intersectional experience shaped the
recognition and litigation of sexual harassment as sex discrimination.
The process of translating and generalizing the particular experiences of
women of color into a universal language of sex discrimination often caused
race and intersectional insights to fade from view, however.76 This
“whitewashing” of Title VII law reflected a larger trend in antidiscrimination
law. African American feminists’ triumphs in the 1970s came at a price.
Putting a white face on feminists’ agenda increasingly seemed expedient,
especially to advocates intent on building coalitions to resist the headwinds of
an increasingly conservative political climate.77 Employment policies that
targeted single mothers, for example, “affected a wide swath of women, and
universalizing their appeal could broaden feminists’ constituency and defuse
troubling stereotypes” about black unwed mothers.78 In Title VII cases and in
sex equality law more generally, discrimination claims’ origins in the
experiences of black women and in the intersection of race and sex often gave
way to a focus on “pure” sex discrimination, untainted by the complexities of
intersectionality.79
Throughout the 1970s, African American feminists often found themselves
“torn between [a] universalist approach that emphasized commonalities
between black and white, male and female, and a more particularistic view that
focused on minority women’s interests.”80 Balancing these conflicting
imperatives required a thoughtful amalgam of insider and outsider sensibilities,
and careful attention to context and audience. When speaking to skeptical
black women and men, these advocates often argued for strategic alliances
with white feminists. When acting as government officials, they sometimes
quietly—but often forcefully—advanced the interests of women of color and
working-class women, as well as of white women. African American feminists
spoke to many audiences about how intersectional experiences shaped their
political outlook and advocacy, and they did not shy away from constructive
76

“By 1980, when the EEOC issued sexual harassment guidelines for public comment,
some advocates worried that policy makers had forgotten the roots of sexual harassment law
in the experiences of black women. They insisted that for women of color, sexual
harassment could not be separated from racial subordination.” MAYERI, REASONING FROM
RACE, supra note 8, at 145 (citing Carrie N. Baker, Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment in
the 1970s, 30 FEMINIST STUD. 7, 21-22 (2004)).
77 On the effects of rightward political drift on feminist legal advocacy during the 1970s,
see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, 76-106, 186-224.
78 Id. at 57 (“Like Ida Phillips, other white women challenged job training programs that
explicitly favored male job seekers, trained women for inferior positions, and focused on job
categories that excluded women.”); see also id. (“The plight of white or racially nonspecific ‘women’ increasingly dominated feminists’ political lobbying as well as their
litigation strategy.”).
79 Id. at 167.
80 Id. at 57-58. On the whitewashing phenomenon in constitutional sex equality law, see
id. at 144-85.
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criticism of anti-racist and feminist movements. Aileen Hernandez, for
instance, grew fond of quoting a young black poet’s reproach to white women
activists, concluding with the line, “‘We share all of your problems; we share
few of mine.’”81
IV. TITLE VII AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERSECTIONALITY AS A CATEGORY
OF CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS
Despite the integral role of intersectional experiences in informing the
origins and early development of Title VII, court opinions that acknowledged,
much less discussed, intersectionality were few and far between. In some
cases, judges explicitly rejected the notion that plaintiffs suffering from what
would later be called intersectional or complex bias could find refuge in Title
VII. By the late 1980s, an intersectionality anti-canon had emerged, featuring
cases such as DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Division,82 which
rejected the claim of Emma DeGraffenreid and her co-workers that a GM
plant’s “last hired-first fired” layoff policy discriminated against black women
and seemed to foreclose the possibility of bringing combined race-sex
discrimination claims; Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.,83 where a court
upheld the employer’s ban on a “corn row” hairstyle against a Title VII
challenge by an African American woman; and Moore v. Hughes Helicopters,
Inc.,84 which denied a black female plaintiff’s motion to represent a class that
included white women.
The intersectionality anti-canon helped to inspire and inform a new
generation of scholarship and advocacy. Beginning in the early 1980s, EEOC
lawyer and later law professor Judy Scales-Trent published several articles
highlighting Title VII’s failure to address black women’s workplace
experiences.85 Indeed, many if not most of the early classics of intersectionality
legal scholarship featured Title VII cases as primary evidence of
81

Id. at 58.
413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th
Cir. 1977) (“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race
discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.”).
For more on the factual background of DeGraffenreid, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE,
supra note 8, at 102-04.
83
527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
84 708 F.2d. 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983).
85 Trent Ellis, supra note 75, at 39-44 (describing the reluctance of courts to allow black
women to claim discrimination under Title VII based on both racial and sexual harassment);
Judy Scales-Trent, Comparable Worth: Is This a Theory for Black Workers?, 8 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 51, 53-54 (1984); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:
Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 16-20 (1989)
(discussing black women’s intersectional Title VII claims). For an early analysis of the
difficulty of bringing race-plus-sex discrimination class action claims, see Elaine W.
Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment
Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1980).
82

728

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:713

antidiscrimination law’s essentialist, exclusionary, and one-dimensional
approach to identity and to subordination. Crenshaw’s foundational 1989
article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, critiqued
DeGraffenreid and two other Title VII cases in which courts rejected African
American women as representative plaintiffs in class actions involving black
men and white women.86 The centerpiece of Regina Austin’s classic Sapphire
Bound!, published the same year, was Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club87—
Crystal Chambers’ Title VII challenge to her termination for a non-marital
pregnancy.88 Paulette Caldwell’s A Hair Piece, published in 1991, famously
dissected Rogers v. American Airlines and placed employers’ discriminatory
grooming policies in the larger context of black women’s denigration and
subordination in and out of the workplace.89
Title VII attracted the attention of intersectionality theorists for several
reasons. First and perhaps foremost, the anti-canon included court opinions
that seemed spectacularly oblivious to the realities of black women’s
workplace experiences.90 In addition, the categorical language of the
provision—banning discrimination “because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin”91—and the relative paucity of officially
recognized legislative history provided little guidance on how to address
complex or multiple claims. Perhaps most obviously, Title VII cases forced
courts to address directly what was often an unspoken subtext in other kinds of
cases—the racial and gender dynamics of human behavior.92
The intersectional critique of Title VII doctrine that emerged in the late
1980s and early 1990s had several dimensions. Many anti-canonical opinions
made the basic error of dismissing black women’s complaints of
discrimination because white women and black men had not suffered
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Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 140 (describing how the “single-axis framework” for
viewing discrimination claims “erases Black women in the conceptualization, identification
and remediation of race and sex discrimination”).
87
629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d sub nom., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.,
834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
88 Austin, supra note 2, at 550-58.
89 Caldwell, supra note 2, at 366-72. Other early articles on intersectionality and Title
VII include Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 21 (1991); Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII,
Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1991); and Cathy Scarborough, Note, Conceptualizing Black Women’s
Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989).
90 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
92 On the difficulty of unearthing the dynamics of race, gender, and class in legal fields
such as torts and contracts, see Austin, supra note 2, at 546-48 (describing the challenges of
conducting research based on legal problems specific to black women because judicial
opinions often pay “no attention to race, sex, and class”).
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discrimination.93 Others baldly denied the reality of American cultural
practices and their social meaning by, for example, deeming policies that
prohibited traditional African American hairstyles race- and sex-neutral.94
Some opinions reflected the reluctance of courts to allow black women to
represent non-black women or black men in class actions, or, as Crenshaw put
it, judges’ preferences for “pure” sex discrimination claims uncomplicated by
racial hierarchy or bias.95
Even decisions that ostensibly recognized the possibility of intersectional
claims proved to be of limited utility to plaintiffs, scholars charged. The Fifth
Circuit opinion in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Association,96
for instance, contained encouraging language allowing black women to bring
combined race/sex discrimination claims, but employed an awkward “sexplus” analysis.97 In Chambers, the court recognized the viability of a pregnant,
unmarried, black woman’s Title VII claim only to find that the employer’s
desire to provide positive “role models” for young black girls was a business
necessity.98 In Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,99 the court allowed African
American women to “aggregate” evidence of racial and sexual harassment, but
implied that race and sex discrimination were “additive” rather than
inextricably intertwined, mutually reinforcing, and manifest in particular
stereotypes, epithets, and abuses directed toward female employees of color.100
These Title VII decisions informed broader critiques of anti-discrimination
law and of anti-racist and feminist movements—critiques that contained
echoes of earlier generations even as they broke new ground. Crenshaw’s 1989
article, for instance, sounded familiar themes about black women’s
marginalization within anti-racist and feminist movements and agendas, about
interpretations of Title VII that undermined potential coalitions and pitted
subordinated subgroups against one another, and about the lasting impact of
the Moynihan Report on the American political imagination.101
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DeGraffenreid is the main exemplar. 413 F. Supp. 142, 144 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
94 See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
95 See Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 143-50 (discussing Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, 708
F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983), and Payne v. Travenol, 416 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Miss. 1976)).
96 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
97 Id. at 1032-33. For an in-depth discussion of the shortcomings of “sex-plus” analysis
for intersectional cases, see Kotkin, supra note 6, at 1463-81. For more on Jefferies, see
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 8, at 197-98.
98 Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d 697, 703 (8th Cir. 1987).
99 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
100 Id. at 1416-17.
101 See Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 140, 163-166 (discussing how focus on “race- and
class-privileged women” in sex discrimination cases “contributes to the marginalization of
Black women in feminist theory and antiracist politics,” and the “latest versions of a
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By the Civil Rights Act’s thirtieth anniversary, a rich body of
intersectionality legal scholarship, prominently featuring Title VII cases as
nemeses, had emerged.102 Although a number of courts had, by the early
1990s, recognized the viability of combined race/sex discrimination claims,
legal scholar Kathryn Abrams concluded in 1994 that judges’ application of
Title VII to “complex” claims and identities sorely lacked the depth, nuance,
and sophistication of the growing interdisciplinary body of scholarship on
intersectionality.103 Even decisions ostensibly friendlier to intersectional
plaintiffs than the anti-canonical rulings often equivocated about the viability
of complex claims, or simply failed adequately to analyze their legal,
historical, and moral basis.104
Twenty years later, judicial opinions containing thoughtful analysis of
intersectional claims remain few and far between; legal theory and scholarship
on intersectionality continue to vastly outpace actual Title VII doctrine.105 To
this day, there is no robust canon of intersectionality case law.106 Moreover,
recent studies of how claims of “complex bias” fare in court reflect a difficult
climate for plaintiffs who claim multiple or intersectional forms of
employment discrimination.107 Class actions of any sort are even more difficult
to bring,108 and disparate impact theories increasingly come under attack.109
The picture is not entirely bleak, however, especially if we look beyond
doctrine. African American women and other women of color continue to play
leading roles as plaintiffs, attorneys, policymakers, and legal strategists, and to
sustain enduring and effective coalitions between civil rights and feminist
102

See sources cited supra note 2.
Abrams, supra note 2.
104 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
105 The literature on intersectionality is far too various and voluminous to do it justice
here. For a small sampling of recent theoretical and interdisciplinary work on
intersectionality, see Symposium, Intersectionality: Theorizing Power, Empowering Theory,
38 SIGNS 785 (2013).
106 The scholarly consensus seems to be that Lam v. University of Hawaii, a 1994 Ninth
Circuit case, was the “high water mark” for intersectionality doctrine. Kotkin, supra note 6,
at 1475 (discussing Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994)). MacKinnon also
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Catharine A. MacKinnon, Intersectionality as Method: A Note, 38 SIGNS 1019, 1020
(quoting Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d. 314, 326 (D. Md. 2003)).
107 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (rejecting
female plaintiffs’ argument for class certification on commonality grounds).
109 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (holding that before an
employer can take a race-conscious action to avoid disparate impact, the employer must
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VII’s disparate impact provision).
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organizations. Latinas, Asian-American women, LGBTQ individuals, and
others have joined African American women at the forefront of intersectional
advocacy as well as theory.110 And, of course, litigation success is but one
measure of political and legal efficacy. Legislative lobbying, public education
campaigns, workplace initiatives, and other forms of advocacy increasingly
feature spokespersons and causes that reflect the insights of intersectionality.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the relative silence about intersectionality in employment
discrimination jurisprudence, intersectionality played a central role in the early
development of Title VII and in the later emergence of critical legal
scholarship on anti-discrimination law. Pauli Murray’s own complex identity
and insider/outsider status led her—and other black feminist leaders such as
Eleanor Holmes Norton and Aileen Hernandez—to believe that a civil rightsfeminist coalition was crucial to African American women’s advancement.
Their pioneering advocacy helped Title VII become the glue that held this
crucial alliance together in the 1970s. The intersectional experiences of women
of color also contributed mightily to important expansions of Title VII’s
coverage. For instance, early cases challenging employment bans on unmarried
mothers often featured women of color claiming race and sex discrimination,
and African American women played an integral role in the early litigation and
enforcement of sexual harassment law. Intersectionality’s triumph was doubleedged, however, as race and other complex identities often faded from legal
advocacy in favor of “pure” sex discrimination and racially non-specific
women as standard-bearers.
The marginalization of intersectional claims by social movements and legal
decision-makers helped to inspire scholarly breakthroughs in the 1980s, 1990s,
and beyond. Much as the feminist reaction to the Moynihan Report proved
productive in crystallizing a powerful critique of the male-breadwinner/femalehomemaker model as a prerequisite for racial progress, the critical race
feminist response to courts’ skepticism about intersectional claims catalyzed an
influential and field-changing scholarly movement that resonated far beyond
the realm of employment discrimination law or even legal doctrine itself. But a
half-century after Pauli Murray promoted an intersectional Title VII, the law
has yet to reciprocate.

110 For a contemporaneous assessment of the politics of coalition, see, for example, Mari
J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1183 (1991). For a study of intersectional advocacy in one feminist legal
organization, see Judy Scales-Trent, Equal Rights Advocates: Addressing the Legal Issues of
Women of Color, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 34 (1998). Intersectionality and related
concepts have also influenced European law and scholarship. For a critical perspective on
recent developments in EU law, see Jess Bullock & Annick Masselot, Multiple
Discrimination and Intersectional Disadvantages: Challenges and Opportunities in the
European Union Legal Framework, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 57 (2012-13).

